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Retaining through Training: Even for Older Workers
* 
 
This paper investigates whether on-the-job training has an effect on the employability of 
workers. Using data from the Netherlands we disentangle the true effect of training incidence 
from the spurious one determined by unobserved individual heterogeneity. We also take into 
account that there might be feedback from shocks in the employment status to future 
propensity of receiving firm-provided training. We find that firm-provided training significantly 
increases future employment prospects. This finding is robust to a number of robustness 
checks. It also holds for older workers, suggesting that firm-provided training may be an 
important instrument to retain older workers at work. 
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Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) aim to increase employment rates by stimulating
job ﬁnding rates and reducing job separation rates. In recessions ALMP are used to
dampen the effects of the downturn in employment. In the recent crisis temporary shorter
working hours arrangements, often in combination with increased training of workers,
were used as instruments. Indeed several countries reported measures to provide training
to existing workers at risk of job loss (OECD, 2010).
On-the-job training is an investment by individuals and ﬁrms which is aimed at up-
grading individuals’ human capital and which might pay back in terms of better labour
market performances and higher productivity in the future. Training helps individuals to
meet the needs of a changing economic and technological environment, enlarge the spec-
trum of competences, increase productivity, send good signals to employers, and thereby
avoid unemployment events and return faster at work in case of job loss.
The question whether adult training affects labour market performances and produc-
tivity of individuals has been the core of substantial debates and research investigations.
A strand of the literature analyses whether training programmes are tools to integrate the
unemployed into the work force. Training programmes are found to have a modest or no
effect on unemployment exit rates (Gerﬁn and Lechner, 2002; Andrén and Andrén, 2006;
Crépon et al., 2007; Lechner et al., 2008; Lalive et al., 2008; Sianesi, 2008) and on wages
(Heckman et al., 1999). Positive effects are instead found on the future employment sta-
bility (Crépon et al., 2007; Lechner et al., 2008) and Jones et al. (2009) show that training
is signiﬁcantly and positively associated with job satisfaction.
A similar branch of this literature has tried to understand how on-the-job training af-
fects wages and other performance measures. Gritz (1993) concludes that participation
in training improves the employment prospects, especially for women, the youth, and
minorities. Bonnal et al. (1997) report that, in the private sector, on-the-job training in-
creases the employment rates, especially for young workers. Bartel (1995) shows that, at
ﬁrm level, wages and productivity are positively affected by on-the-job training. Finally,
several other studies ﬁnd that on-the-job training has a signiﬁcantly positive impact on
productivity (see, among others, Bartel, 1994; Barrett and O’Connell, 2001; Conti, 2005;
Dearden et al., 2006).
In the Netherlands, previous evaluation studies have tried to infer the impact of dif-
ferent kind of training programmes on future employment prospects. Ridder (1986) dis-
tinguishes between training, recruitment, and employment programmes. He ﬁnds that es-
pecially women and ethnic minorities beneﬁt from training programmes. Sanders and de
Grip (2004) investigate whether training participation might affect low-skilled workers’
2ﬁrm-internal and ﬁrm-external mobility. They ﬁnd that training increases ﬁrm-internal
mobility, but it does not affect ﬁrm-external employability. Lastly, Pavlopoulos et al.
(2009) analyse the effect of training on low pay mobility. They ﬁnd that training increases
the chances for upward wage mobility and therefore improves earnings prospects.
All in all, the effect of training on employment prospects is often found to be some-
what disappointing. Either training does not increase job ﬁnding rates signiﬁcantly or
even modest negative effects are found (see also Kluve (2010) for a recent overview
study). Whereas the effect of training on job ﬁnding rates has been studied quite fre-
quently, the effect on job separation rates is rarely investigated.1
Using data on the Netherlands from the European Community Household Panel (EC-
HP), we investigate whether ﬁrm-provided training enhances the probability of retaining
workers into the workforce in the Netherlands. From the econometric viewpoint, it is
challenging to disentangle the pure effect of training from the spurious one determined
by individual unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity might indeed jointly
determine the likelihood of training participation and the labour market performances:
motivation, labour market attachment, innate ability. Using semiparametric techniques
to control for the endogeneity of training participations, we explicitly model the inter-
related dynamics leading to training and determining the future employment prospects.
We also take into account that there might be feedback from current employment shocks
to individuals’ future probability of receiving ﬁrm-provided training. As a result, we are
able toestimate policy-relevant effectsof on-the-job training participationon employment
prospects later in life.
We ﬁnd that in the Netherlands ﬁrm-provided training signiﬁcantly improves future
employability, i.e training leads to retaining.2 We also focus on the effect for older work-
ers. As in many other European countries, the labour market position of older workers is
cause for concern in the Netherlands, given that the demographic trends are causing an
ageing of the workforce and that older workers’ job separations are often a one-way street
out of the labour force and into long-term unemployment. We ﬁnd that older workers
who receive training are more likely to remain employed. We suggest that additional on-
the-job training of workers, especially older workers, can be inﬂuenced by government
1Using cross-country time series data on unemployment rates Boone and van Ours (2009) ﬁnd that
training has a signiﬁcant negative effect on unemployment. They do not attribute this to the positive effect
of training on the job ﬁnding rate but to the negative effect on the job separation rate. Training increases the
human capital of participants and therefore the quality of their post-unemployment job increases, leading
to lower job separation rates.
2In a companion paper, Picchio and van Ours (2011), we show that in the Netherlands ﬁrm-sponsored
training is affected by labour market imperfections but not by product market competition. If labour mo-
bility goes up employers are less willing to invest in training. If product market competition increases
employer sponsored training is unaffected.
3policy, for example by providing the employers with age-speciﬁc subsidies to stimulate
ﬁrm-provided training. Furthermore, an age-speciﬁc ﬁring tax may persuade employers
to train older workers, increasing thereby older workers’ employability.
This paper is set up as follows. The data are described in Section 2. Section 3 formal-
izes the econometric model and clariﬁes the identiﬁcation strategy. The estimation results
are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data Description
The data used in this paper are from the 1994–2001 waves of the longitudinal dimension
of the ECHP, a rotating panel survey based on harmonized methodology and deﬁnitions
across several European countries. The ECHP contains nationally representative samples
of households and covers a large set of of topics such as work, income, ﬁnancial situation,
housing, family, health, training and education, and social relations. We select data for the
Netherlands, where the survey was annually conducted by Statistics Netherlands, under
the coordination of Eurostat. The longitudinal ECHP data for the Netherlands comprise
a number of individual records that range from 12,000 to 13,000 per year over the time
window 1994–2001, for a total of 100,716 records.
From the original Dutch ECHP panel data, we lose the 1994 wave as information
on training was not collected in 1994 in the Netherlands. We focus on prime age and
older workers, i.e. workers who are older than 26 and younger than 64 years of age
and who are either employee or not employed. Self-employed workers are deemed to be
structurally different from employees and therefore are excluded from the sample. We
drop observations with missing values in the variables used in the econometric analysis
and we drop individuals that are not in the sample for at least three consecutive time
periods between 1994 and 2001. The latter restriction is due to the fact that we estimate
a dynamic model of order one with unobserved effects. Hence, one time period is lost
because of the model dynamics. A further period is lost as we will use initial values to
correct for initial conditions induced by the presence of unobserved effects.
After the application of these sample selection criteria, we have an unbalanced panel
of 7,257 individuals, for a total of 33,348 individual-year observations, from 1996 until
2001.3 Table 1 clariﬁes the structure of our data.
3Whe have an unbalanced panel due to attrition, missing information, and sample renewal for issues
of representativeness over time. We assume that attrition and missing information are random. It would
have been interesting to use more recent data. Unfortunately, it is not possible to use data the EU database
on Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) as this database does not contain information about
training.
4Table 1: The Structure of the Unbalanced Panel
Individual records Total records
Years of observation Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
(the initial year t = 0 is not included) frequencies frequencies frequencies frequencies
2000–2001 496 0.070 992 0.030
1999–2000 67 0.010 134 0.004
1999–2001 407 0.057 1,221 0.037
1998–1999 36 0.006 72 0.002
1998–2000 44 0.006 132 0.004
1998–2001 223 0.032 892 0.027
1997-1998 53 0.009 106 0.003
1997-1999 50 0.007 150 0.005
1997–2000 32 0.005 128 0.004
1997–2001 248 0.035 1,240 0.037
1996–1997 514 0.073 1,028 0.031
1996–1997/2000–2001 41 0.006 164 0.005
1996–1998 522 0.072 1,566 0.047
1996–1999 574 0.087 2,296 0.069
1996–2000 473 0.074 2,365 0.071
1996–2001 3,477 0.451 20,862 0.626
Total N = 7;257 1.000 NT = 33;348 1.000
We are interested in whether and to what extent the employability of a worker – the
probability of remaining employed – is affected by ﬁrm-provided training. The non-
employment indicator is constructed on the basis of the ILO deﬁnition of employment
status. It is denoted by yit and it is equal to 1 if individual i is not in the workforce at
time t and 0 otherwise. The ﬁrm-provided training indicator wit is instead equal to 1 if
employee i attended vocational education courses paid or organized by the ﬁrm since the
beginning of the previous year and 0 otherwise.4
Table 2 reports the probabilities of being out of the workforce conditional and uncon-
ditional of previous employment situation. The unconditional non-employment probabil-
ity is 30.8% and it shows a strong persistence, possibly due to individual observed and
unobserved heterogeneity: someone not employed at t   1 is almost 20 times as likely
not to be employed at t as someone employed at t   1. The non-employment probability
is lower for those who attended some ﬁrm-provided training in the past than those who
did not: 1.9% against 5.5%. Note that the probability of attending ﬁrm-provided training
courses seems to be strongly affected by the past employment condition. This might be
due to individual observed and unobserved heterogeneity but it might also reﬂect feed-
back effects going from current shocks in the employment status to future probability of
attending ﬁrm-provided training.
Table 3 displays the observed transitions between employment positions and, as ex-
4Webuildthenon-employmentindicatoronthebasisofvariablesPE003andPE004oftheECHPsurvey.
The ﬁrm-provided training indicator is built on the basis of variables PT001 and PT017.
5Table 2: Raw Conditional and Unconditional Nonemployment Probabilities
Employment status at t   1
Employed with Employed without
Not employed ﬁrm-provided training ﬁrm-provided training Total
Employment status at t
Not employed .883 .019 .055 .308
Employed with ﬁrm-provided training .004 .285 .043 .041
Employed without ﬁrm-provided training .113 .696 .902 .651
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Observations 10,243 1,389 21,716 33,348
pected, most of the individuals show a strong persistence in employment. The identiﬁca-
tion of the effect of training on employees’ employability comes from observations out of
the diagonal of this transition matrix.
Table 3: Absolute (Relative) Frequencies of Transitions between Labour Market Positions
Employment status at t   1
Employed with Employed without
Not employed ﬁrm-provided training ﬁrm-provided training Total
Employment status at t
Not employed 9,048 (.271) 26 (.001) 1,194 (.036) 10,268 (.308)
Employed with ﬁrm-provided training 36 (.001) 396 (.014) 931 (.028) 1,363 (.041)
Employed without ﬁrm-provided training 1,159 (.035) 967 (.029) 19,591 (.588) 21,717 (.651)
Total 10,243 (.307) 1,389 (.042) 21,716 (.651) 33,348 (1.000)
Table 4 presents summary statistics of the outcome variables and of the variables used
in the speciﬁcation of the employment equation. We control for gender, education, age,
years of potential work experience, health status, number of household components, pres-
ence of children in the household (younger than 12 years old), position in the family, and
time indicators.5 The average age is about 43 years with 18 years of potential working ex-
perience. More than 53% of the people in the sample are women, 54% have a secondary
degree, and more than 23% do not have a good health situation. On average each house-
hold has 3 members, while 35% of the sample has a child younger than 12 years of age in
the household. Almost 86% of the people are living in a couple (married or unmarried).
Table 5 shows summary statistics of the covariates entering the training equation for
employees. In this case further variables capturing job and employment characteristics
are used to explain employees’ probability of receiving ﬁrm-provided training: contract
arrangement, part-time indicator, occupational dummies, job tenure, and sector and ﬁrm
5In the model speciﬁcation we also included the interactions between gender and presence of children.
6Table 4: Summary Statistics of the Pooled Sample
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Female .531 .499 .000 1.000
Education ISCED 5-7 .205 .404 .000 1.000
Education ISCED 3 .536 .499 .000 1.000
Education ISCED 0-2 .259 .438 .000 1.000
Age 43.498 10.047 26.000 64.000
Potential experience (years) 18.102 13.662 .000 52.000
Bad health(b) .232 .422 .000 1.000
Number of household members 3.019 1.287 1.000 8.000
Presence of kids younger than 12 .354 .478 .000 1.000
Individual is cohabiting .856 .351 .000 1.000
ln(household net income)(b) 3.822 1.947 .000 6.661
1996 .168 .374 .000 1.000
1997 .179 .384 .000 1.000
1998 .172 .377 .000 1.000
1999 .169 .375 .000 1.000
2000 .165 .371 .000 1.000
2001 .147 .354 .000 1.000
Observations NT 33,348
Number of individuals N 7,257
(a) We build the health indicator on the basis of variable PH001, which reports self-
perceived health. It is equal to one in case of fair, rather bad, or bad health conditions.
It is equal to zero in case of either good or very good health conditions.
(b) The household net income is computed from the variables HI100 and PI100. It does
not include the income of the corresponding individual and it is in constant prices
(2000 prices). It is deﬂated by using the Consumer Price Index (CPI), gathered by
Statistics Netherlands.
size indicators. About 82% of the employees have a permanent job and more than 30%
work on a part-time basis. Almost half of the employees are high-skilled white collar
workers, more than 71% work in the service sector, and more than 50% work in ﬁrms
with more than 100 employees. More than 26% of the workers have a job in the public
sector.
3 Econometric Modelling
In this Section we describe a multivariate discrete response model for panel data to inves-
tigate whether the employment probability is affected by participation in ﬁrm-provided
training courses. There are reasons to suspect that the training indicator is a potentially
endogenous human capital variable. First, there might be self-selection issues related to
unobserved heterogeneity: time-invariant individual characteristics, unobservable by the
econometrician, that jointly determine the probability of being at work and participating
in training. Innate ability, intelligence, motivations, and labour market attachments are
examples of such endowments that, if ignored, may lead to biased parameter estimates
(Heckman, 1981; Hyslop, 1999). Second, there might be feedback effects from employ-
7Table 5: Summary Statistics of Employees
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Female .459 .498 .000 1.000
Education ISCED 5-7 .238 .426 .000 1.000
Education ISCED 3 .538 .499 .000 1.000
Education ISCED 0-2 .223 .416 .000 1.000
Age 41.364 8.902 26.000 64.000
Potential experience (years) 2.441 11.506 .000 52.000
Bad health .166 .372 .000 1.000
Number of household members 3.055 1.267 1.000 8.000
Presence of kids younger than 12 .375 .484 .000 1.000
Individual is cohabiting .860 .347 .000 1.000
ln(household net income) 3.785 1.922 .000 6.561
1996 .163 .370 .000 1.000
1997 .174 .379 .000 1.000
1998 .171 .376 .000 1.000
1999 .170 .376 .000 1.000
2000 .170 .376 .000 1.000
2001 .151 .358 .000 1.000
Permanent contract .818 .386 .000 1.000
Part-time job .301 .459 .000 1.000
Blue collar worker(a) .257 .437 .000 1.000
Low-skilled white collar worker(a) .246 .431 .000 1.000
High-skilled white collar worker(a) .497 .500 .000 1.000
Agriculture .012 .110 .000 1.000
Industry .195 .396 .000 1.000
Services .711 .453 .000 1.000
Unknown sector .082 .274 .000 1.000
Public employment .261 .439 .000 1.000
Unknown job tenure .140 .347 .000 1.000
Job tenure 0-4 years .301 .459 .000 1.000
Job tenure 5-9 years .184 .387 .000 1.000
Job tenure 10-14 years .127 .332 .000 1.000
Job tenure 15 years or more .248 .432 .000 1.000
Firm size is not applicable .145 .353 .000 1.000
Firm size 0-4 employees .033 .178 .000 1.000
Firm size 5-19 employees .117 .321 .000 1.000
Firm size 20-49 employees .108 .310 .000 1.000
Firm size 50-99 employees .089 .284 .000 1.000
Firm size 100-499 employees .222 .416 .000 1.000
Firm size 500 employees or more .286 .452 .000 1.000
Observations NT 23,080
Number of individuals N 5,609
(a) We built the occupational dummies on the basis of variable PE006C. We deﬁne as
high-skilled white collars those workers who reported to be legislators, senior ofﬁcers,
managers, professionals, technicians, or associate professionals. We deﬁne as low-
skilled white collars those workers we were clerks, service workers, or shop/market
sales workers. We deﬁne as blue collars those workers employed as skilled agricul-
tural or ﬁshery workers, craft and related trades workers, plant and machine operators
and assemblers, or elementary occupations.
8ment status to future training participation, i.e. shocks in the employment status affecting
future probabilities of training participation. There are indeed reasons to expect that fu-
ture participation in a training programme can be correlated to the recent labour market
history (Bassi, 1984; Ham and LaLonde, 1996). For instance, individuals with a nega-
tive transitory shock in the employment probability can be seen as less reliable and less
attached to the labour market and, therefore, employers might be less willing to provide
them with training courses. Alternatively, individuals that involuntarily exit employment
might change their behaviour and invest in their own human capital.
We use a discrete response unobserved effects model for panel data that can deal with
these endogeneity issues. We jointly model the employment status and, in case of em-
ployment (yit = 0), the ﬁrm-provided training participation. The model is designed with
a dynamic recursive structure. The current employment status depends on the past em-
ployment condition and upon ﬁrm-provided training received in the past. Similarly, for
those who are at work, the probability of receiving ﬁrm-provided training depends on the
previous employment condition and past training participation. More in detail, the inter-
related dynamics between employment situation and training participation are speciﬁed
using a panel data bivariate unobserved effects probit model, i.e. for i = 1;:::;N and
t = 1;:::;T
yit = 1[yit 11 + wit 11 + x
0
it1 + c1i + u1it > 0] (1)
wit = 1[yit 12 + wit 12 + z
0
it2 + c2i + u2it > 0] if yit = 0; (2)
where:
• 1[] is the indicator function;
• xit is the vector of strictly exogenous covariates explaining the employment status
and 1 is the conformable vector of parameters;
• zit is the vector of strictly exogenous covariates explaining training participation and
2 is the conformable vector of parameters;
• (c1i;c2i) is the time-invariant individual heterogeneity characterized by joint distri-
bution with, a priori, unrestricted correlation structure;
• u1it and u2it are iid errors with standard normal distribution.
This model is a modiﬁed version of the one in Alessie et al. (2004) and similar to that used
by Stewart (2007) to analyse the interrelated dynamics of unemployment and low-wage
employment and by Picchio (2008) to study the stepping-stone effect of temporary jobs.
Equation (1) shows that in each time period the probability of individual i of being
out of the workforce at time t is determined by a vector of observed characteristics, xit,
9by unobserved heterogeneity, c1i, and by the previous employment situation (employment
without training, employment with training, or nonemployment). The previous employ-
ment situation is described by the values taken by yit 1, equal to one in case of nonem-
ployment, and by the values taken by wit 1, equal to one in case of employment with
ﬁrm-provided training. The coefﬁcients 1 and 1 are of particular interest. The former
is the effect of previous nonemployment on the current employability with respect to the
case of employment without ﬁrm-provided training. The latter is the effect of previous
employment with ﬁrm-provided training on the current employability with respect to the
case of employment without ﬁrm-provided training.
For those who are at work, equation (2) describes the process determining the proba-
bility of receiving ﬁrm-provided training. This is affected by a set of observed character-
istics, zit, by unobservables, c2i, and by past employment situation. The coefﬁcient 2 is
the effect of past employment with training, rather than without training, on the current
probability of receiving training.
Although the u1it and the u2it are assumed iid, the composite error terms will be cor-
related over time due to the presence of the individual ﬁxed effects c1i and c2i. They will
also be correlated across equations due to unrestricted correlation structure between c1i
and c2i. In other words, unconditional on c1i and c2i the nonemployment equation is corre-
lated to the training equation, but once we condition on these unobserved factors (and on
a set of observed characteristics) the two processes are independent. Note that if the two
equations are independent, wit 1 is weakly endogenous in the employment equation and
equation (1) could be estimated in a univariate framework with predetermined regressors.
3.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity and Initial Conditions
The dynamic unobserved effects probit model in equations (1) and (2) can distinguish
between spurious effects determined by unobserved heterogeneity and the true effect of
lagged variables (state dependence). However, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
generates two problems that must be faced when estimating such a non-linear model:
ﬁrst, how to get rid of the ﬁxed effects c1i and c2i as it is well known that they cannot
be treated as parameters to be estimated due to the incidental parameters problem (e.g.
Heckman, 1981); second, the initial conditions problems that arise in a dynamic model
when the initial observations of the outcome variables are correlated to the unobserved
heterogeneity.
We solve for these problems by mixing parametric and semiparametric assumptions.
First, we allow for dependence between observed and unobserved characteristics by us-
ing a Mundlak (1978) version of Chamberlain’s (1984) approach. Second, the initial
10conditions problem is addressed by using Wooldridge’s (2005) approach.6 Formally, the
parametric speciﬁcation of the unobserved heterogeneity terms is assumed to be,
c1i =  x
0
i1 + yi01 + wi0 1 + v1i; (3)
c2i =  z
0
i2 + yi02 + wi0 2 + v2i; (4)
where  xi and zi are the individual time averages of respectively xit and zit, and yi0 and wi0
are the realizations of the outcome variables at the date of entry into our sample. The term
vi  (v1i;v2i) is residual unobserved heterogeneity and it is assumed to be independent of
observed characteristics. The unobserved time-invariant factors are allowed to be cross-
correlated, so as to capture cross-equation correlation. In our preferred speciﬁcation,
we avoid too strict parametric assumptions on the distribution of the random unobserved
heterogeneity. We follow Heckman and Singer (1984) and assume that the vector vi is a
random draw from a discrete distribution function. More in detail, we assume that v1i and
v2i have two points of support each with the following four probabilities:
p



























with 4 = 0:
Note that v1 and v2 are independent if and only if p1p4 = p2p3 (see van den Berg and
Lindeboom, 1998; van den Berg and Ridder, 1994). This makes it easy to test whether
the nonemployment and training equations are independent. Furthermore, it can be shown




(p1 + p3)(p2 + p4)(p1 + p2)(p3 + p4)
:
6AnalternativecorrectionoftheinitialconditionsproblemisinHeckman(1981)anditisbasedonasep-
arate formulation of the processes leading to the ﬁrst realizations of the outcome variables, in order to get an
approximation of the conditional distribution of the initial conditions. In this study, we prefer Wooldridge’s
(2005) approach because the true processes are already ongoing when the ﬁrst observations are recorded
and they are likely to be generated in the same way as later observations. Moreover, Wooldridge’s (2005)
approach is computationally less demanding.
113.2 The Likelihood Function
Ourassumptionswithrespecttotheindividualheterogeneitydistributionandontheinitial










i2+yi02+wi0 2+v2i+u2it>0] if yit=0: (6)
Since the unobserved heterogeneity term vi is not observed and is a random term from
a bivariate distribution, it can be integrated out when the model is estimated by maximum
likelihood (ML). The probability masses and the location of the points of support of the
discrete unobserved heterogeneity distribution are estimated by ML jointly with all the
other parameters. On the basis of model in equations (5) and (6) and the assumptions on





























where  denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
The log-likelihood function is the sum over the sample of the log of the individual likeli-




4.1 Dynamic Unobserved Effects Probit
Tables 6 and 7 display the estimation results of four speciﬁcations of the dynamic unob-
served effects probit model. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is the benchmark model as described
in Section 3 and our preferred speciﬁcation.
In the second speciﬁcation, job characteristics are not included among the explanatory
variables of the training equation. As job characteristics may not be strictly exogenous,
we check thereby whether the results are sensitive to their (in)exclusion. As shown by
Table 6, the exclusion of job characteristics from the training equation has little effect
on the estimation results. Our preferred speciﬁcation is however the ﬁrst one, since job
7We used the Matlab minimizer fminunc with analytic ﬁrst derivatives to obtain the ML estimates.
12characteristics can help to control for time-varying factors (e.g. the quality of the job
match) which might be correlated to the probability of receiving ﬁrm-provided training
and, at the same time, to the probability of keeping the job.
In the third speciﬁcation, we change the assumptions about the distribution of the un-
observed heterogeneity term vi and we impose a bivariate normal distribution with zero
meanandcorrelationv, insteadofadiscretedistribution. Weﬁndthatspeciﬁcation1isto
be preferred according to likelihood criteria, e.g. the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
reported at the bottom of Tables 6 and 7. While in speciﬁcation 1 we can conﬁdently
reject the null hypothesis of independent equations, this is not the case in speciﬁcation 3.
As a matter of fact, the estimation results in speciﬁcation 4, a single-equation model for
employment status, are in line with those of speciﬁcation 3. This suggests that impos-
ing too strict parametric assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity term vi results in
model misspeciﬁcation and biased estimation results.
In the upper panel of Tables 6 and 7 we report usual coefﬁcient estimates. In the sec-
ond panel we report instead estimated predicted probabilities and average partial effects
(APEs) that are of focal interest in this paper. They are aimed at quantifying the size of
the effects under analysis. There are different ways in which the marginal effect of yit 1
and wit 1 on the nonemployment probability can be estimated in a dynamic unobserved
effects probit model. At the sample mean of the exogenous regressor ( x), we deﬁne:
• 1 as the probability of being currently nonemployed conditional on employment
without ﬁrm-provided training in the previous period;
• 2 as the probability of being currently nonemployed conditional on employment
with ﬁrm-provided training in the previous period;
• 3 astheprobabilityofbeingcurrentlynonemployedconditionalonnonemployment
in the previous period.
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13We obtain the APEs by taking the difference between these quantities.8 Two APEs are
particular useful for discussion: b 2   b 1 and b 2   b 3. The former measures the effect
on the nonemployment probability of previous employment with ﬁrm-provided training
rather than without ﬁrm-provided training. It is a measure of whether and to what extent
ﬁrm-provided training boosts employees’s chances to be retained in the workforce in the
future. The latter is the effect on the nonemployment probability of previous employment
with ﬁrm-provided training rather than previous nonemployment.
The benchmark model (speciﬁcation 1 in Table 6) gives an APE of past employment
with training, rather than employment without training, of -0.052, statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% conﬁdence level. An employee with a given set of observed and unobserved
characteristics is 5.2 percentage points less likely to be out of the workforce at t if she
had been employed with training at t   1 than if she had been employed without training
at t   1. It is a quite large effect: the nonemployment probability decreases from 32.6
percentage points to 27.4 percentage points, i.e. by 16%. As shown in Table 2, the
corresponding ﬁgure from raw data is 65.5%. This points out that more than three fourths
of the raw effect of ﬁrm-provided training on employability is spurious and determined
by observed and unobserved characteristics.
Three other issues are worth mentioning. First, it is clear from the statistics in Table
2 that there is a sizeable persistence in nonemployment: people who were out of the
workforce at t 1 are about 46 (16) times more likely to be nonemployed at t than people
who were employed with (without) ﬁrm-provided training at t 1. These ﬁgures become
much smaller but still sizeable when we get rid of spurious state dependence induced by
individual heterogeneity (observed and unobserved): an individual is “only” about twice
as likely to be nonemployed at t if she had been out of the workforce at t 1 as if she had
been employed with or without training at t   1.9
Second, the estimated correlation between the unobserved determinants of nonem-
ployment and training is negative, -0.665, and highly signiﬁcant. Unobserved character-
istics, like ability, motivation, and attachment to work, affect positively the probability of
receiving ﬁrm-provided training and negatively the probability of being out of the work-
force.
Third, in speciﬁcation 3 we fail to capture the cross-equation correlation induced by
unobserved heterogeneity, probably because of too strict parametric assumptions on its
8Standard errors of the predicted probabilities and of the APEs are estimated by bootstrapping the results
(individual-cluster bootstrap with replacement).
9More in detail, with raw data the nonemployment probability decreases from 88.3% to 1.9% in case of
employment with training and to 5.5% in case of employment without training. Once we net out spurious
state dependence, the nonemployment probability decreases from 52% to 27.4% in case of employment
with training and to 32.6% in case of employment without training.
14Table 6: Dynamic Unobserved Effects Probit Model
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2
Nonemployment Firm-provided Nonemployment Firm-provided
equation training equation equation training equation
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Nonemploymentt 1 1.715 *** .033 -.093 .101 1.717 *** .033 -.156 .099
Firm-provided trainingt 1 -.546 *** .115 .738 *** .060 -.281 ** .111 .756 *** .059
Female .205 *** .044 -.010 .051 .211 *** .044 -.056 .045
Education - Reference: Education ISCED 0-2
Education ISCED 5-7 -.270 *** .046 -.113 * .059 -.266 *** .046 .086 .053
Education ISCD 3 -.206 *** .035 .001 .046 -.205 *** .035 .057 .044
Age/10 -1.732 *** .154 .171 .259 -1.759 *** .154 .243 .254
Age squared/1000 2.408 *** .177 -.418 .336 2.441 *** .177 -.570 * .332
Work experience/10 1.285 *** .185 -.279 .340 1.285 *** .185 -.635 ** .321
Work exper. squared/1000 .073 * .037 -.013 .061 .077 ** .037 -.007 .059
Bad health .218 *** .042 .062 .062 .218 *** .042 .050 .060
No. household members .069 * .040 .006 .051 .071 * .040 -.030 .050
Kids<12 years .227 * .127 .012 .108 .234 * .126 .001 .104
Kids<12 yearsFemale .165 .146 -.311 ** .155 .156 .146 -.433 *** .150
Living in a couple -.493 *** .136 .049 .139 -.498 *** .136 .098 .137
ln(household net income) .072 *** .015 -.040 ** .020 .071 *** .015 -.041 ** .019
Permanent contract – – .072 .062 – – – –
Part-time job – – -.310 *** .083 – – – –
Public employment – – .114 .071 – – – –
Occupation indicators – Reference: High-skilled white collar worker
Blue collar – – -.215 ** .085 – – – –
Low-skilled white collar – – -.202 *** .063 – – – –
Sectoral indicators – Reference: Services
Agriculture – – .041 .384 – – – –
Industry – – -.224 *** .086 – – – –
Unknown sector – – -.322 *** .081 – – – –
Job tenure indicators – Reference: 0-4 years
Unknown – – -.312 ** .144 – – – –
5-9 years – – -.269 *** .065 – – – –
10-14 years – – -.227 ** .091 – – – –
15 years or more – – -.267 ** .121 – – – –
Initial conditions and unobserved heterogeneity support points
Nonemployment0 1.384 *** .075 .505 *** .115 1.407 *** .077 .004 .085
Firm-provided training0 -.059 .105 .357 *** .069 -.144 .102 .449 *** .071
b v1
j 1.998 *** 6.571 -2.199 *** .482 2.042 *** .304 -2.067 *** .477
b v2
j .539 * 1.812 -1.426 *** .497 .560 * .297 -1.284 *** .472
b v -.665 *** .208 .114 .144
Predicted probability b p1 .326 *** .015 – – .325 *** 0.017 – –
Predicted probability b p2 .274 *** .021 – – .297 *** 0.022 – –
Predicted probability b p3 .520 *** .009 – – .518 *** 0.009 – –
APE: b p2   b p1 -.052 *** .012 – – -.028 *** 0.012 – –
APE: b p2   b p3 -.247 *** .025 – – -.221 *** 0.025 – –
NT (N) 33,348 (7,275) 33,348 (7,275)
Log-likelihood -11,812.7 -11,946.7
No. of parameters 103 67
Pseudo-R2 .542 .536
Test of independent eq. 2
1=5.32 p-value=.021 2
1=.94 p-value=.332
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at 1% level. Time dummies, form size indicators,
and individual time average of the time-varying covariates are included in the model speciﬁcation but not reported for the sake of
brevity. The standars errors are robust to within-individual correlation and heteroskedasticity. The standard errors of the predicted
probabilities, APEs, and u are obtained by bootstrapping the resuls 399 times (individual-cluster bootstrap with replacement).
15Table 7: Dynamic Unobserved Effects Probit Model
Speciﬁcation 3 Speciﬁcation 4
Nonemployment Firm-provided Nonemployment
equation training equation equation
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Nonemploymentt 1 2.155 *** .035 -.254 .240 2.155 *** .035
Firm-provided trainingt 1 -.311 *** .086 .925 *** .045 -.304 *** .085
Female .143 *** .033 -.020 .046 .144 *** .033
Education - Reference: Education ISCED 0-2
Education ISCED 5-7 -.199 *** .037 -.087 * .048 -.199 *** .038
Education ISCD 3 -.143 *** .029 .016 .039 -.143 *** .029
Age/10 -1.299 *** .135 .292 .224 -1.304 *** .135
Age squared/1000 1.827 *** .161 -.592 ** .290 1.832 *** .160
Work experience/10 1.300 *** .205 -.372 .276 1.296 *** .205
Work exper. squared/1000 -.048 .031 -.016 .051 -.048 .031
Bad health .182 *** .041 .050 .058 .181 *** .042
No. household members .051 .035 .001 .045 .050 .035
Kids<12 years .171 ** .083 .000 .095 .173 ** .084
Kids<12 yearsFemale .123 .111 -.309 ** .137 .120 .111
Living in a couple -.398 *** .101 .080 .111 -.398 *** .101
ln(household net income) .064 *** .015 -.038 ** .017 .064 *** .015
Permanent contract – – .109 .071 – –
Part-time job – – -.275 *** .077 – –
Public employment – – .120 * .070 – –
Occupation indicators – Reference: High-skilled white collar worker
Blue collar – – -.190 ** .074 – –
Low-skilled white collar – – -.180 *** .065 – –
Sectoral indicators – Reference: Services
Agriculture – – .070 .320 – –
Industry – – -.188 ** .087 – –
Unknown sector – – -.289 *** .078 – –
Job tenure indicators – Reference: 0-4 years
Unknown – – -.223 * .134 – –
5-9 years – – -.244 *** .058 – –
10-14 years – – -.187 ** .084 – –
15 years or more – – -.205 * .112 – –
Constant .597 ** .266 -2.048 *** .407 .607 ** .266
Initial conditions and unobserved heterogeneity correlation
Nonemployment0 .560 *** .036 .140 * .074 .559 *** .036
Firm-provided training0 -.097 .084 .248 *** .053 -.096 .084
b v -.230 .235 – –
Predicted probability b p1 .260 *** . – – .260 *** .021
Predicted probability b p2 .221 *** . – – .221 *** .026
Predicted probability b p3 .603 *** . – – .604 *** .016
APE: b p2   b p1 -.040 *** . – – -.039 *** .011
APE: b p2   b p3 -.383 *** . – – -.383 *** .040
NT (N) 33,348 (7,275) 33,348 (7,275)
Log-likelihood -11,937.8 -7,441.8
No. of parameters 99 31
Pseudo-R2 .537 .639
Test of independent eq. 2
1=.36 p-value=.843 –
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at 1% level. Time dummies,
ﬁrm size indicators, and individual time average of the time-varying covariates are included in the model
speciﬁcation but not reported for the sake of brevity. The standars errors are robust to within-individual
correlation and heteroskedasticity. The standard errors of the predicted probabilities and APEs are ob-
tained by bootstrapping the resuls 399 times (individual-cluster bootstrap with replacement).
16distribution. The state dependence of nonemployment is overestimated: the predicted
probability b p3 and the estimated coefﬁcient of the lagged nonemployment indicator are
indeed much larger than those in speciﬁcation 1. The APE of employment with training
instead of employment without training is equal to -0.040 and, therefore, it is slightly
overestimated by the failure in capturing cross-equation correlation.
Looking at the impact of exogenous variables on the nonemployment probability,
women are less likely to be at work. The proﬁle of the age and nonemployment prob-
ability has an inverted U-shape while, ceteris paribus, the probability of being out of the
workforce increases with potential work experience. Higher educated people and those
living in a couple are more likely to be at work. Those with health problems or high
household income are less likely to be employed.
With regard to the ﬁrm-provided training equation, there is evidence of state depen-
dence: people getting ﬁrm-provided training at t   1 are more likely to receive ﬁrm-
provided training at t. It is interesting to note that people not employed at t   1 are as
likely to receive training at t as those who were at work without training at t   1. Higher
educated worker are less likely to receive training, but the coefﬁcient is barely signiﬁ-
cant. There is therefore some evidence that education and ﬁrm-provided training are not
complementary assets, in contrast to the ﬁndings in Blundell et al. (1999) for the US and
the UK. The training probability is lower for women with young kids and increasing with
the household net income, probably due to less attachment to the labour market and/or
more family commitment. Part-time workers are less likely to get ﬁrm-provided training.
High skilled white collar workers are more likely to get training, suggesting that tasks
and human capital formation are complementary assets. Finally, ﬁrm-provided training
is more present in the services sector, among public employees, and among newly hired
workers.10
4.2 Retaining Older Workers
The workforce is ageing in many industrialized countries. The ageing of the workforce
might be caused, in addition to demographic trends, also by the fading out of early retire-
ment programs and by changes in the pension system like changes in the earliest possible
or mandatory retirement age. In the 1980s and in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, the Nether-
lands had one of the lowest employment rates of elderly among the European countries.
For example, in 1992 the Dutch employment rate of persons aged 55 to 64 was 28.7%
10Firm size indicators are included in the speciﬁcation of the training equation (and not reported in Tables
6 and 7) but they are not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
17against an European average of 39.1%.11 Given the economic stagnation in that period,
the low employment rates of older workers were not seen as a major problem, whereas the
high youth unemployment was thought of being problematic. Early retirement programs
were promoted with the aim of giving a contribution to the employment of new entrants in
the labour market. However, with the ageing of the population and the resulting pressures
on the pension system, the Dutch early retirement system was no longer sustainable. A
series of policy reforms were introduced with the aim of reducing the generosity of the
early retirement schemes and creating incentives for postponing retirement. Hence, the
response to population ageing was based on increasing labour supply and delaying retire-
ment.12 By 2009, the employment rate of older workers had increased to 52.6%, larger
than the European average but still lower than the OECD average.
Given the ageing of the workforce, the labour market position of older workers is
cause for increasing concern. If employed, their position is usually ﬁne as they are not
very likely to be dismissed. As a matter of fact, older workers are well-protected by
seniority rules and employment protection legislation. Nevertheless, if older workers lose
their job, they ﬁnd it very hard to ﬁnd a new one. Gielen and van Ours (2006) show that
cyclical adjustments of the workforce in the Netherlands occur partly through ﬂuctuations
in separations for older workers. These separations are likely to be a one-way street out
of the labour force into long-term unemployment.13 Employers are indeed reluctant to
hire an older worker because of the pay-productivity gap and because of the possible
obsolescence of general human capital. As training can refresh general human capital,
avoid its obsolescence, and increase workers’ productivity, it can be a channel through
which retirement can be postponed and employability of the older workers increased.
In this Section, we focus on the effect of ﬁrm-provided training on employability
by allowing this effect to be heterogeneous across three age categories: 26–35, 36–49,
and 50–64. The corresponding indicator variables are interacted with the lags of the
nonemployment indicator and of the ﬁrm-provided training indicator. The benchmark
model is augmented by these interactions and by the age indicators and re-estimated.
Table 8 reports the estimation results of the coefﬁcients and APEs of primary interest.
Thecoefﬁcientoftheinteractionsbetweenthelagtrainingindicatorandtheagecategories
are (jointly) not signiﬁcantly different from zero. This means that ﬁrm-provided training
11These ﬁgures are available in the Eurostat webpage http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=-
LFS_SEXAGE_I_R.
12Empirical studies found that the Dutch reforms had a positive effect on the labour force participation
of older workers (Euwals et al., 2010).
13Gielen and van Ours (2006) suggest that training of older workers in public training programs would
help them to acquire new skills and to adapt to new demands, such that these workers are more likely to
retain their jobs.




Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Reference: employed without ﬁrm-provided training and age within [26;35]
Nonemploymentt 1 1.405 *** .058 -.083 .143
Firm-provided trainingt 1 -.547 *** .168 .766 *** .078
Nonemploymentt 1Age [36;49] .346 *** .063 -.023 .187
Nonemploymentt 1Age [50;64] .691 *** .073 -.104 .350
Firm-provided trainingt 1Age [36;49] -.062 .218 -.008 .095
Firm-provided trainingt 1Age [50;64] -.042 .287 -.372 ** .179
Age [36;49] -.102 .067 -.116 .077
Age [50;64] -.509 *** .105 -.046 .133
Predictions and APEs if age [26;35]
Predicted probability b 1 .339 *** .018 – –
Predicted probability b 2 .283 *** .027 – –
Predicted probability b 3 .502 *** .011 – –
APE: b 2   b 1 -.055 *** .017 – –
APE: b 2   b 3 -.218 *** .028 – –
Predictions and APEs if age [36;49]
Predicted probability b 1 .328 *** .018 – –
Predicted probability b 2 .268 *** .028 – –
Predicted probability b 3 .532 *** .011 – –
APE: b 2   b 1 -.060 *** .018 – –
APE: b 2   b 3 -.265 *** .033 – –
Predictions and APEs if age [50;64]
Predicted probability b 1 .288 *** .021 – –
Predicted probability b 2 .228 *** .040 – –
Predicted probability b 3 .525 *** .013 – –
APE: b 2   b 1 -.060 * .032 – –
APE: b 2   b 3 -.297 *** .044 – –
NT (N) 33,348 (7,257)
Log-likelihood -11,760.6
No. of parameters 115
Pseudo-R2 .544
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
All the variables included in the benchmark speciﬁcation are also included here: the cor-
responding estimated coefﬁcients are not reported for the sake of brevity. The standars er-
rors are robust to within-individual correlation and heteroskedasticity. The standard errors
of the predicted probabilities and APEs are obtained by bootstrapping the resuls 399 times
(individual-cluster bootstrap with replacement).
19is able to reduce the future probability of being out of the workforce for younger workers
as well as for older workers. Note also that the interactions between lag non-employment
status and age categories are signiﬁcantly different from zero and point out that older
workers not employed at t   1 are more like to be not employed at t than prime aged and
young workers. This suggests that once older workers lose their jobs, they are less likely
to ﬁnd a new one. The coefﬁcient of the indicator for older workers is instead signiﬁcantly
negative: older individuals are less likely to lose their jobs and therefore to be out of the
workforce.
The estimation of the APEs at the sample means of the other variables conﬁrm that
ﬁrm-provided training reduces the probability of being not employed with the same mag-
nitude over age classes. An employee with a given set of observed and unobserved char-
acteristics and in the age range 50–64 is 6 percentage points less likely to be out of the
workforce at t if she had been employed with training at t   1 than if she had been em-
ployed without training at t   1. This ﬁgure is equal to that for employees in the age
range 36–49 and slightly bigger in size than that of young workers. There is evidence
therefore that ﬁrm-provided training substantially increases the employability of older
workers as well as the employability of young workers. Firm-provided training might be
an important tool to lighten the burden of population ageing on the pension system in the
Netherlands.
To some extent training is endogenous to retirement institutions. In 2006 in the public
sector in the Netherlands pre-pension plans for every worker born after December 31,
1949 were abolished. To receive the same pension beneﬁts the younger cohort has to
postpone retirement for about 13 months. Montizaan et al. (2010) show that this change
in future pension beneﬁts had an effect on the expected retirement age and, through this,
a positive effect on workers’ training participation. We show that this is rational to do
since training leads to retaining of jobs. To retain employability of older workers age-
speciﬁc subsidies to stimulate job training might be used or alternatively age-speciﬁc
layoff taxes may be introduced.14 The ﬁrst type of policy would it make it more attractive
for employers to train older workers thus increasing the likelihood that they retain their
employment. The second type of policy would make it more expensive for employers
to ﬁre older workers thus making it more attractive to train these workers and thereby
increasing the likelihood that they retain their employability.
14Schnalzenberger and Winter-Ebmer (2009) show that an age-speciﬁc ﬁring tax affected the labour
market position of older workers in Austria. Employers had to pay a tax of up to 170% of the gross monthly
income when they gave notice to a worker age 50 or more. This tax caused a substantial reduction in layoffs
for older workers.
204.3 Further Robustness Checks
We perform two further sensitivity analyses to assess whether our estimates are robust
to misspeciﬁcation: i) due to omitting information about individuals who might have
attended vocational training courses not provided by the ﬁrm; ii) of the dynamics.
With regard to the former, the problem might arise as an omitted time-varying variable
indicating whether the employee has undertaken training courses not provided by the ﬁrm
is very likely to be correlated to the participation to a ﬁrm-provided training and, at the
same time, to the future employment status. To asses whether this might be a problem,
we build an indicator variable qit equal to 1 if employee i attended vocational education
courses which were not paid or organized by the ﬁrm since the beginning of the previous
year and 0 otherwise.15 The incidence of training not provided by the ﬁrm is equal to
3.5% among the employees of our sample. Firstly, we include the variable qit in the
model speciﬁcation as an exogenous variable and then as a predetermined variable (weak
exogenous). In both cases, we ﬁnd estimation results of the quantities of interest that are
very much in line with those of the benchmark model. Secondly, we jointly model the
process determining training not provided by the ﬁrm and the other two equations of the















i3+yi03+wi0 3+qi0'3+v2i+u3it>0] if yit=0;
where  is the loading factor determining, together with v2i, the points of support of the
equation of training not provided by ﬁrms. The loading factor is used to simplify the
speciﬁcation of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution and reduce the computational
difﬁculty in estimating the model. The likelihood function of the benchmark model can
be trivially extended to the three-equation case.
Table 9 reports the estimation results of the three-equation model. All the estimates
of the nonemployment equation and of the ﬁrm-provided equation are in line with those
of the benchmark model reported in Table 6. Looking at the equation for training not pro-
vided by the ﬁrm, it is noted that the past employment status and the past training matter:
people who were nonemployed in the past are more likely to train in the future than those
who were employed without any form of training. This type of “catch-up” response is in
line with the empirical evidence in Mroz and Savage (2006), who found that recent unem-
15The indicator for vocational training not provided by the ﬁrm is built on the basis of variables PT001,
PT008, and PT017 of the ECHP data.
21Table 9: Dynamic Unobserved Effects Probit Model with 3 Simultaneous
Equations
Nonemployment Firm-provided Other vocational
equation training equation training equation
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Nonemploymentt 1 1.725 *** .034 -.065 .102 .196 ** .095
Firm-provided trainingt 1 -.479 *** .116 .779 *** .060 .201 *** .076
Other vocational trainingt 1 .244 *** .093 .096 .089 1.386 *** .061
Female .208 *** .044 -.009 .050 .044 .056
Education - Reference: Education ISCED 0-2
Education ISCED 5-7 -.269 *** .046 -.102 * .058 -.027 .062
Education ISCD 3 -.206 *** .035 .008 .045 -.023 .049
Age/10 -1.748 *** .155 .395 .252 -.271 .187
Age squared/1000 2.431 *** .179 -.697 ** .326 .194 .247
Work experience/10 1.290 *** .186 -.350 .343 .156 .400
Work exper. squared/1000 .073 * .038 -.003 .061 -.006 .075
Bad health .218 *** .042 .060 .062 -.130 .080
No. household members .072 * .040 .003 .052 -.106 .067
Kids<12 years .229 * .128 .012 .110 .160 .170
Kids<12 yearsFemale .165 .147 -.315 ** .156 -.126 .223
Living in a couple -.490 *** .138 .055 .140 .051 .146
ln(household net income) .071 *** .015 -.039 ** .020 -.001 .023
Permanent contract – – .083 .062 -.103 .079
Part-time job – – -.298 *** .083 .245 *** .085
Public employment – – .116 .072 -.148 .092
Occupation indicators – Reference: High-skilled white collar worker
Blue collar – – -.205 ** .086 -.253 ** .106
Low-skilled white collar – – -.193 *** .064 .040 .076
Sectoral indicators – Reference: Services
Agriculture – – .050 .381 .609 ** .305
Industry – – -.218 ** .086 -.030 .117
Unknown sector – – -.321 *** .082 -.152 .105
Job tenure indicators – Reference: 0-4 years
Unknown – – -.289 ** .144 -.009 .147
5-9 years – – -.259 *** .066 .077 .086
10-14 years – – -.213 ** .092 .182 .144
15 years or more – – -.245 ** .122 .230 .195
Initial conditions and unobserved heterogeneity support points
Nonemployment0 1.389 *** .077 .417 *** .111 .119 .086
Firm-provided training0 -.083 .107 .348 *** .067 .138 * .083
Other vocational training0 .004 ** .104 .166 ** .081 .363 *** .069
b v1
j 2.005 *** .307 -2.552 *** .475 – –
b v2
j .540 * .300 -1.803 *** .509 – –
b v -.528 * .293
b  .314 ** .130
Predicted probability b 1 .324 *** .015 – – – –
Predicted probability b 2 .279 *** .022 – – – –
Predicted probability b 3 .520 *** .009 – – – –
APE: b 2   b 1 -.045 *** .015 – – – –
APE: b 2   b 3 -.241 *** .025 – – – –
NT (N) 33,348 (7,275)
Log-likelihood -14,535.4
No. of parameters 176
Pseudo-R2 .501
Test of independent eq. 2
1=224.98 p-value=.000
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at 1% level. Time dummies,
ﬁrm size indicators, and individual time average of the time-varying covariates are included in the model
speciﬁcation but not reported for the sake of brevity. The standars errors are robust to within-individual
correlation and heteroskedasticity. The standard errors of the predicted probabilities and APEs are obtained
by bootstrapping the resuls 239 times (individual-cluster bootstrap with replacement).
22ployment spells has a signiﬁcant positive effect on whether a young man trains today in
the US. As pointed out by Mroz and Savage (2006), the “catch-up” response is predicted
by the economic theory: people with a recent nonemployment spell enter the current pe-
riod with a lower stock of human capital than otherwise identical individuals. When they
re-enter the workforce, they dynamically re-optimize their investments in human capital
and their new optimal time-path of human capital investments might lie above the one of
otherwise identical individuals who did not suffer the employment shock and the loss of
human capital.
Table 10: Dynamic Unobserved Effects Probit Model
with Lag of Order Two
Nonemployment Firm-provided
equation training equation
Variable Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Nonemploymentt 1 1.884 *** .036 -.114 .126
Nonemploymentt 2 .769 *** .042 .154 .108
Firm-provided trainingt 1 -.466 *** .115 .760 *** .060
Predictions and APEs if the individual was employed at t   2
Predicted probability b 1 .232 *** .030 – –
Predicted probability b 2 .172 *** .035 – –
Predicted probability b 3 .533 *** .015 – –
APE: b 2   b 1 -.060 *** .016 – –
APE: b 2   b 3 -.361 *** .046 – –
Predictions and APEs if the individual was not employed at t   2
Predicted probability b 1 .343 *** .019 – –
Predicted probability b 2 .274 *** .031 – –
Predicted probability b 3 .688 *** .029 – –
APE: b 2   b 1 -.068 *** .019 – –
APE: b 2   b 3 -.414 *** .056 – –
NT (N) 33,348 (7,275)
Log-likelihood -8,999.0
No. of parameters 103
Pseudo-R2 .550
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; *** signiﬁcant
at 1% level. All the variables included in the benchmark speciﬁcation are also
included here: the corresponding estimated coefﬁcients are not reported for the
sake of brevity. The standars errors are robust to within-individual correlation
and heteroskedasticity. The standard errors of the predicted probabilities and
APEs are obtained by bootstrapping the resuls 399 times (individual-cluster
bootstrap with replacement).
In a second sensitivity analysis, we check whether our ﬁndings are robust to the mis-
speciﬁcation of the dynamics. We set up a dynamic model where employment status and
ﬁrm-provided training enter up to the lag of order two. We ﬁnd that the lag of order two
of the ﬁrm-provided training indicator does not signiﬁcantly affect the nonemployment
probability (p-value equal to 0.134) and thereby removed from the model speciﬁcation.
Table 10 reports the estimation results of the lagged variables. The sample size is now
smaller: one more time period is lost as a consequence of the dynamic of higher order. A
23nonemployment event at t   2 reinforces the positive effect of a nonemployment event at
t   1 on the probability of being out of the workforce at t. The estimated coefﬁcient of
lagged training is qualitatively in line with the one of the benchmark model. We estimated
the APEs by conditioning on the nonemployment status at t   2. In case of employment
at t   2, the APE of working with training at t   1 rather than working without training
at t   1 is of -6 percentage points in the probability of being nonemployed (-26%). If not
at work at t   2, the APE is equal to -6.8 percentage points (-20%). This suggests that
the estimated APE b 2   b 1 of our benchmark model is not sensitive to the dynamic spec-
iﬁcation and, if any, it suffers from an upward bias. Note however that when we take the
model with a dynamic of higher order, we lose observations and we restrict the analysis
to individuals that are in the panel for at least four consecutive waves. This makes the as-
sumption of no attrition less likely to hold. We therefore prefer to stick to the speciﬁcation
with a dynamic of order one.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies the relationship between on-the-job training and employability in the
Netherlands. In our analysis we disentangle the true effect of training from the spuri-
ous effect that might be induced by self-selection of non-random individuals into train-
ing participation. We ﬁnd that ﬁrm-provided training signiﬁcantly improves employment
prospects. For prime age workers who generally have a strong labour market position, in
the sense that after job loss they ﬁnd a new job quite easily, this relationship may be of
limited interest. However, we also investigate whether for older workers training leads
to higher employability. We ﬁnd that older workers who receive on-the-job training are
more likely to keep employment.
In many countries the labour market position of older workers is cause for concern.
Older workers’ job separations are often a one-way street out of the labour force and
into long-term unemployment. This is a reason for concern since demographic trends are
causing an ageing of the workforce. Therefore, improving the employment position of
older workers is very important from a policy point of view. Our research ﬁndings suggest
that on-the-job training may be an important instrument to achieve this goal. Our research
does not provide direct evidence on how to stimulate on-the-job training. Nevertheless we
suggest that, in order to retain employability of older workers, age-speciﬁc subsidies to
stimulate job training might be used or, alternatively, age-speciﬁc layoff taxes may be
introduced. The ﬁrst type of policy would make it more attractive for employers to train
older workers, thus increasing the likelihood that they retain their employability. The
24second type of policy would make it more expensive for employers to ﬁre older workers,
thus making it more attractive to train these workers and thereby increasing the likelihood
that their employment prospects improve.
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